By Cecilia E.L. Mendy
The Kanifing Magistrates’ Court Thursday upheld a “no-case submission” filed on behalf of members of the Gambia Against Looted Assets (GALA) and acquitted and discharged all three accused persons.
The GALA Members were charged in connection with a 2025 protest against the removal of former Auditor General, Modou Ceesay.
The ruling was delivered by Magistrate Sallah Mbai after the defence, led by counsel L.S. Camara, submitted that the prosecution had failed to establish a prima facie case against the accused persons at the close of its case.
The accused persons were charged with two counts: unlawful assembly contrary to section 63 of the Criminal Offences Act, 2025, and common nuisance contrary to section 137(1) of the same Act.
According to the particulars of the charges, the accused persons allegedly conducted themselves in a manner likely to cause a breach of the peace on 15 September 2025 at the National Audit Office and other locations within the Kanifing Municipality by holding a protest against the removal of the Auditor General without a permit from the Inspector General of Police.
The second count alleged that the conduct caused annoyance, obstruction or inconvenience to the public.
The accused persons pleaded not guilty to both charges.
Inspector Jallow represented the Inspector General of Police, while counsel A.J. Njie appeared for the accused persons.
The prosecution called four witnesses before the defence made a submission of no case to answer. Police Commissioner A. Sanneh opposed the application and urged the court to require the accused persons to enter their defence.
In his submission, defence counsel L.S. Camara argued that the prosecution failed to establish the essential elements of both offences. He said none of the witnesses provided evidence proving the ingredients of unlawful assembly under section 62 of the Criminal Offences Act.
He further argued that there was no evidence showing that the accused persons caused annoyance, obstruction or inconvenience to the public to constitute common nuisance.
The prosecution maintained that a prima facie case had been established, arguing that the accused persons had assembled for a common purpose, failed to disperse upon police instructions and did not have a permit for the protest.
The prosecution also relied on sections 62 and 63 of the Criminal Offences Act, section 5 of the Public Order Act and section 25 of the Constitution in urging the court to call on the accused persons to enter their defence.
In its ruling, the court said the main issue for determination was whether the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence requiring the accused persons to answer the charges.
The court noted that in criminal proceedings, the burden of proof rests entirely on the prosecution and does not shift to the accused persons. It added that an accused person benefits from the presumption of innocence and can only be required to defend a charge after the prosecution establishes a prima facie case.
The court held that it was not required at that stage to determine whether the accused persons were guilty beyond reasonable doubt, assess the credibility of witnesses or resolve conflicts in evidence, but only whether sufficient evidence existed upon which a reasonable tribunal could convict if no defence was offered.
The court observed that its decision should not be interpreted as an endorsement of the actions of either the accused persons or the police, stressing that the issue before it was solely whether the prosecution had established a case requiring a defence.
The court found that the prosecution failed to discharge that burden on both counts.
Addressing the prosecution’s reliance on section 5 of the Public Order Act, the court ruled that the provision had no application to the charges before it because the accused persons were not charged under that legislation.
The court stated that an accused person must answer only the specific offence charged and that the prosecution could not use legal arguments to introduce provisions from another law to address evidential gaps in the charges before the court.
The court therefore rejected the prosecution’s reliance on section 5 of the Public Order Act in determining whether a prima facie case had been established.
The court subsequently upheld the no-case submission filed by defence counsel L.S. Camara and acquitted and discharged all three accused persons on both counts.
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