By: Isatou Sarr
The High Court Annex in Banjul has dismissed an appeal filed by Ebrima Dibba against the Inspector General of Police (IGP), ruling that the appeal lacked merit.
The matter was heard before Justice Sonia Akinbiyi, who delivered her ruling after considering arguments from both parties on whether the trial magistrate had jurisdiction to entertain a charge of sedition without the written consent of the Attorney General as required under Section 53(2) of the Criminal Code.
The appellant argued that prosecutions for sedition under Sections 51(1)(a) and 52 of the Criminal Code require the personal written consent, or fiat, of the Attorney General. According to the defence, the prosecution conducted by the Solicitor General without such consent was invalid and rendered the proceedings a nullity.
In response, the prosecution argued that the defence had misinterpreted the law. Relying on Section 2 of the Law Officers Act, the prosecution submitted that the Solicitor General, as a law officer working with the Attorney General, is empowered to perform the functions of the Attorney General either in his absence or under his authority.
The prosecution further contended that the appeal lacked merit and was intended to delay the substantive proceedings. It maintained that the powers granted to the Solicitor General under the Law Officers Act allowed him to act on behalf of the Attorney General in the institution and conduct of proceedings.
In her ruling, Justice Akinbiyi noted that the central issue was whether the law permits the delegation or substitution of the Attorney General’s powers to the Solicitor General.
She observed that while the term “fiat” generally implies express permission or authorisation, statutory provisions granting broad powers to the Solicitor General may amount to a standing authorisation, thereby eliminating the need for a separate fiat in every case.
The judge further held that for proceedings to be declared a nullity, the defect complained of must be fundamental and affect the court’s jurisdiction. She stated that where authority has been validly exercised through a legally empowered delegate, the proceedings cannot automatically be rendered invalid.
Justice Akinbiyi found that the defence’s reliance on a strict interpretation of the term “fiat” overlooked the statutory powers conferred on the Solicitor General under the Law Officers Act.
She held that a prosecution initiated by the Solicitor General, acting under the authority of the Attorney General’s Office, is valid and amounts to a prosecution by the Attorney General.
Relying on the authorities of Okonkwo v. State (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt. 204) 251 and A.G. Federation v. A.G. Abia State & Others (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt. 725) 677, Justice Akinbiyi concluded that the prosecution substantially complied with the requirements of the Criminal Code.
“Upon the foregoing findings, the appeal by the accused person lacks merit and is hereby dismissed,” the judge ruled.